The purpose of this paper is to generalize the theory of "equal share analysis", developed by Selten in 1972, to the one in which every player has a positive weight. We show that for any positive vector of weights, α ∈ R N ++ , it is always possible to find a coalition structure and a payoff vector forming a proportional regular configuration.
Introduction
The present work relies on the notion of "equal share analysis", an insight into cooperative games introduced by Selten (1972) . In contrast with most cooperative game analysis, Selten assumes that any outcome of cooperation cannot be separated from the coalitions that the players are going to form, and so, his analysis gives as a solution, a coalition structure and an allocation to the players. Selten's assumptions, which he observed empirically, are expressed in the form of three hypothesis about the outcome of a characteristic function game with restricted cooperation (a game). A solution satisfying the three hypothesis imposed by Selten is called a regular configuration and Selten showed that such a solution always exists.
In the equal share analysis, Selten (1972) considers that all the players have the same weight in the game. This assumption is in many situations far too restrictive, as illustrated in this article, for instance, when applied to the class of financial cooperative games (Izquierdo and Rafels 2001) where the asymmetry of the players is given by the capital they wish to invest.
The main goal of this paper is, following Selten's work, to extend his result of existence of regular configurations to the case where not all the players have the same weight. Thus, we consider that a coalition structure and a payoff vector is a proportional regular configuration if it satisfies the generalizations of the three hypothesis given by Selten. The first hypothesis is that the coalition structure is exhaustive, which means that there are no coalitions with incentives to merge. The second hypothesis asserts that the payoff vector is in the equity core (Selten 1978) associated to the coalition structure. The equity core depends on a positive vector α of weights of the players, it is a generalization of the equal division core and it is an extension of the core. Roughly speaking, a payoff vector is in the equity core if no coalition can divide its value proportionally to α and, in this way, give more to all its members than the amount they receive in the payoff vector. After giving a complete and transitive order of strength with respect to α within the players based on the characteristic function, which, in case that all players have the same weight, coincides with the order of strength given by Selten (1972) , the third hypothesis states that the payoff vector preserves the order of strength with respect to α among the players in the same coalition. Our main result in this paper is that for any game (with or without restricted cooperation) and for any vector of weights α we can always guarantee the existence of a proportional regular configuration.
We can find several other descriptive theories in the literature based on equity considerations, namely equal excess theory (Komorita 1979) The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we provide basic notation, terminologies and we introduce the concept of proportional maximal configurations that will be necessary to extend Selten's existence result to the asymmetric case. In Sect. 3 we introduce the orders of precedence and strength with respect to α. In Sect. 4, we give the existence theorem of proportional regular configurations. In Sect. 5, we discuss an application to the class of financial cooperative games (Izquierdo and Rafels 2001). We prove that for this class of games the grand coalition and the proportional
